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ABSTRACT 
Does Decertification Work? Outcome Analysis of the 
National Football League’s Negotiated Order (1986-2008) 
by 
Matthew Bowers 
For decades, union membership and activity has been declining in North America; employers have 
demanded greater flexibility and have successfully weakened workplace and worker protections.  
Modern workers increasingly use alternative strategies to negotiate conditions of employment with 
managers who have limited their discretionary power.  Negotiated order theory provides a useful 
tool for analyzing the mesostructural arrangements of bargaining parties during labor disputes.  
This thesis applies negotiated order theory to explore how and why the National Football League 
(NFL) players have twice decertified their union and sought court intervention to challenge the 
legitimacy of the League’s highly restrictive reserve system.  An outcome-focused content analysis 
was designed as a preliminary investigation to ascertain why an alternative strategy was sought 
and if the strategy proved more effective in securing the players’ preferred ends than conventional 
collective bargaining.  The NFL case offers a fixed market from which to formulate a negotiation 
context of the interorganizational structures and bargaining interactions of its members. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On March 11, 2011, the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) 
decertified as a union for the second time in its 50-year history.  The action came when the 
2006 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the National Football League (NFL) 
and the NFLPA expired.  The two parties failed to reach a new agreement and the owners 
chose to employ a lockout against the players as a negotiation strategy.1  Both parties 
justified the impasse by accusing the other of failing to bargain in good faith.   
The owners argued that the NFLPA never intended to negotiate and always planned 
to decertify.  The NFLPA contended that the owners preferred a lockout in order to undo 
the labor market arrangements established by the expired CBA.  The owners used a clause 
bargained into the 2006 CBA extension that allowed them to opt-out of the contract in 
2008.  In a prepared statement, league representatives said that they were “taking the 
difficult but necessary step of exercising their right under federal labor law to impose a 
lockout of the union.”2   
The players’ reaction to the owners’ lockout was to decertify the NFLPA, which 
disbands the union and its role as sole bargaining representative of the players in 
negotiations with the NFL.  This strategy allowed the players to seek advantage through 
litigation rather than collective bargaining.  Ten players filed suit against the NFL, headed 
                                                          
1 A lockout blocks the players from all NFL operations including salaries, benefits, contract negotiations, player 
transactions, off-season training, and access to team facilities and medical care.   It is a bargaining tactic used by 
employers to prevent employees from working until they accept the employer’s terms. 
2
 Evans, Simon. 2011. “NFL Announces Lockout of Players.” New York Times, March 12, pp. 18.  Retrieved April 28, 
2011 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/12/us-nfl-lockout). 
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by MVP quarterbacks Tom Brady, Drew Brees, and Peyton Manning.  The antitrust lawsuit 
attacks the League’s draft policies, salary cap, standard players’ contract, and free agent 
restrictions.3   
The owners declared the decertification a “sham” and “built on the indisputably 
false premise that the NFLPA has stopped being a union and will merely delay the process 
of reaching an agreement.”4  DeMaurice Smith, executive director of the NFLPA, countered 
that the owners provoked this action.  Smith stated, “I would dare any one of you to pull out 
any economic indicator that would suggest that the NFL is falling on hard times.  For the 
last 14 days the NFL has said, ‘trust us.’  But when it came time for verification, they told us 
it was none of our business.”5  Smith referred to the owners’ refusal to share financial 
information with the NFLPA to justify its claims of lost revenue due to rising player and 
stadium operation costs – the owners’ grounds for opting out of the agreement. Normally, 
each side would file a petition to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) claiming the 
opposition’s failure to bargain in good faith, followed by a bargaining tactic like an owners’ 
lockout and/or players’ strike.  The courts often defer to the NLRB in such disputes and 
prefer a collectively bargained solution over judicial interference.    The courts presume 
that the active parties in negotiation understand the relative issues and context better than 
judges in a court room.   
An obvious question is why did the NFLPA act so definitively when choosing 
decertification as its strategy for negotiation?   The owners consistently insisted that they 
                                                          
3
 Brady v. NFL, 11-CV-639. 
4
 Boren, Cindy. 2011. “Owners React as NFLPA Decertifies.” The Washington Post, March 11.  Retrieved May 2, 
2011 (http://voices.washingtonpost.com/early-lead/2011/03/owner_react_as_union_dec.html). 
5
 NFL.com Wire Reports. 2011. “League Locks Out Players as Union Decertifies.” NFL.COM, March 11.  Retrieved 
April 30, 2011 (http://www.nfl.com/news/story/article/league-locks-out-players-as-union-decertifies). 
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would not hire replacement players and intended to lockout the players once the contract 
expired.   In 1987, the league’s national television contracts were not guaranteed if games 
were canceled due to a work stoppage.  Owners needed to provide a televised product in 
order to earn revenue from the television networks.  They hired replacements, or “scabs,” 
in lieu of the players to maintain operational income and fulfill their contractual 
obligations.  The willingness to use replacement players increased the owners’ leverage in 
negotiations with the striking NFL players.  As a consequence, the players’ solidarity 
dissolved in two weeks as several marquee players crossed the picket lines.  The players 
ended the strike without a new agreement and received minimal concessions from the 
owners.  The 1987 labor dispute illustrates the historical ineffectiveness of the players’ 
bargaining positions in the NFL labor market.   
In the 2011 NFL season, the owners will receive media contract revenue even if no 
games are played.   The owners will not need the NFL players or replacements to ensure 
their short-term profitability.  Presumably, the owners’ resistance to NFLPA demands will 
continue as long as they can maintain operational income.   The owners appear to have 
superior leverage in the 2011 CBA negotiations because of their market situation and 
available resources.  It affords them the ability to withstand a significant work stoppage 
and increases their discretionary leverage in the labor dispute.  Most NFL players are not 
millionaires and need salaries, benefits, training, and access to team facilities to maintain 
their status and economic livelihoods.  Players do not share the owners’ economic position 
and have a limited career life span.   Players, more than owners, seek a more timely 
resolution to this conflict.   
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The current labor conflict stimulates a number of questions.  Does decertified 
litigation give the players more leverage in the NFL labor market?  Does it produce more 
preferred outcomes for players?   Does this explain why the NFLPA advised the players to 
seek litigation so early in the new CBA bargaining period?  Because the court system 
prefers to delegate rulings to the NLRB and current labor laws encourage collective 
bargaining, litigation does not seem expedient.  What advantages does decertification, as an 
alternative negotiation strategy, offer the players that traditional bargaining does not?  
Mere “tactical posturing” by the players seems an unlikely explanation.  The action must 
serve some other meaningful purpose than to simply stall the bargaining process.  
 I used these questions as the basis for my thesis research.  I wished to understand 
the negotiation context that affects employers’ (owners’) relationships with workers 
(players).  I am specifically interested in the alternative mode of action employed by the 
workers in the NFL market to improve their situations.  In other industries, traditional 
labor market arrangements – even those negotiated by unions – for workers seem 
counterproductive to their discretionary needs.   If this is true, workers are compelled to 
pursue alternative modes of action to bargain successfully with employers.  Investigating 
the effectiveness of decertification in the NFL labor market helps to understand a structural 
framework for the action as a possible alternative for future labor negotiations. 
After I review relevant literature and theory in the next chapter, I describe the 
methods I used to compare the outcomes of decertification and CBAs in Chapter 3. A 
historical narrative in Chapter 4 explains the dynamics and points of contention affecting 
the reserve system in the negotiated order produced by the NFL and NFLPA. I also describe 
the applicable laws associated with the labor market negotiations and antitrust lawsuits 
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that routinize the strategies of the NFL and NFLPA within a larger social order. In Chapter 
5, I analyze the outcomes sought by players through collective bargaining and decertified 
antitrust lawsuits. My thesis concludes with a discussion of the importance of 
understanding structural conditions that shape the negotiation context in the NFL. I also 
explain how my findings relate to other contemporary labor issues.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
As contemporary society differentiates at an exponential rate, social actors 
constantly take into account existing social structures and traditional roles to interpret the 
meaning of their interactions (Durkheim 1893; Mead 1913; Simmel 1971; Strauss 1978). 
The tension between structure and change is explored by many theorists, who differ in how 
much influence they assign to social structures versus individuals’ actions.  Structural-
Functionalists view society as a system of interrelated parts that are relatively stable and 
each part serves a function to preserve the social order.  Conflict theorists perceive society 
as a system of inequalities, where the normative structures benefit some people at the 
expense of others.  These social inequalities cause conflict that leads to social change.  
Symbolic Interactionists treat reality as a social product that people can alter in their 
situated interactions with others.  
Sociologists interested in social interaction look beyond biological and cultural 
determinants to focus on how meaning is created and maintained by social actors as they 
perform in everyday life.  This approach is commonly referred to as the “symbolic 
interaction” perspective (Blumer 1969).  Symbolic interaction rests on three primary 
premises: (1) humans act towards things based on the symbolic meaning those things have 
for them, (2) meaning arises out of the interaction of individual actors with others, and (3) 
actors handle and modify meanings through an interpretive process as they deal with 
situations in their environment.  The study of these social processes and the freedom of 
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action in relation to constraints are fundamental emphases of social interaction theorists 
(Fisher and Strauss, 1977). 
 Anselm Strauss’ developed a theoretical framework for understanding and studying 
negotiated orders with a symbolic interaction perspective in Negotiations: Varieties, 
Contexts, Processes, and Social Order (1978).  He explains how modern societies act as 
evolved normative systems that are constantly renegotiated and evaluated against 
traditional arrangements.  People negotiate traditional values using pre-established tacit 
agreements that control what can be discussed, negotiated, and agreed upon.  
The NFL is a social order that is negotiated between opposing actors to satisfy their 
subjective interests.  A social order refers to a set of linked social structures, institutions, 
and actions that conserve, maintain, and enforce ways of relating and behaving (Strauss 
1978).  All social orders are negotiated orders and are human products.  They occur within 
a social arena and are derived from the self-serving interactions of social actors, where an 
actor can be an individual, group, organization, nation-state, etc.  The primary actors 
involved in the NFL’s social order are team owners and league players who negotiate the 
work conditions that affect the NFL’s organizational structures.  The owners’ main interests 
concern the economic viability of their league and to maintain the status quo that protects 
their privileged market positions.  Players seek to negotiate the conditions of the status quo 
concerning salaries, benefits, job mobility, and security in line with their collective 
interests. The sum of all concessions offered by owners to the players as compromise for 
maintaining the status quo represents the evolved conditions of the negotiated order 
(Strauss 1978).    
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 There are several components to all negotiated orders. They are patterned social 
products with temporal limits.  The NFL crafted its organizational structure from Major 
League Baseball (MLB) and used the reserve system as the basis for its social order.  The 
reserve system was an effective mechanism for owners to subordinate players, protect 
their interests, and manage the system’s status quo arrangement (Flynn and Gilbert 2001; 
Garvey 1979; Leeds and Allmen 2005).  As a result, the owners secured monopsony power 
over the labor market and controlled players’ demands by limiting what could be 
discussed, negotiated, and agreed upon.   
As the league’s reserve system evolved, owners marginalized the players by offering 
only minor concessions to appease their demands.  Despite the small improvements, 
players, as subordinate actors, persisted in seeking greater improvements. This reciprocal 
give-and-take relationship of actors within a negotiated order is a constant process, which 
produces its inherent temporal limits.  The status quo is reviewed, reevaluated, and 
renegotiated to remain consistent with the changing values of actors.  Some negotiations 
are terminated as new ones arise to produce better and more efficient status quo 
arrangements.  The negotiated order at any given moment is the totality of its 
organizational structures, rules, policies, and all other agreements, including contracts, 
pacts, and accepted arrangements (Strauss 1978).  The negotiated order of the NFL, then, is 
represented by its constitution and by-laws, which organizes the league’s interactions and 
facilitates the conditional standards of the reserve system. 
Examining the NFL with a symbolic interactionist and negotiated order perspective 
helps us understand how players’ work conditions unfold over time. The sociological 
literature on work conditions and their consequences is extensive; for the purposes of this 
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thesis, organizational size, how work is organized, wages, and mobility are especially 
relevant issues to explore (see also Hodson and Sullivan 2008).   Workers tend to prefer 
small corporate organizations to larger ones because of the perception that it increases 
workers’ discretion concerning the structural conditions of the work environments.  Larger 
organizations can produce feelings of alienation, powerlessness, and isolation because 
workers lose a meaningful purpose to their association and action (Freeman and Rogers 
1999).  The corporate culture of these large organizations can limit, and even change, the 
choices and behaviors perceived to be available by workers who operate within its 
structures (Kunda 1992; Pierce 1993).   
 Salaries and job mobility also affect workers’ perceptions of their work.  Workers’ 
economic livelihoods are directly related to the pay that is earned from their labor.  
Workers use their wages to provide shelter, food, clothing, and other basic essentials to 
sustain their lives. Workers’ wages are consistently regarded as a necessary characteristic 
of a good job (Freeman and Rogers 1999).  Similarly, workers need to feel that hard work 
will pay off and be rewarded.  The lack of job mobility can disenchant workers from the 
labor process and decrease motivation.  For a job to be considered fulfilling, workers often 
state a need for purposeful tasks and an outlined career path (Hodson and Sullivan 2008).  
This is especially true when workers associate their personal self-worth with their level of 
career advancement (Ospina 1996).  Also, the bureaucratic divisions of labor in modern 
labor markets produce a hierarchal pyramid where high-paying jobs are limited and low-
paying jobs are relatively abundant (Gordon 1996).  Access to better paying jobs can 
become a fierce competition between workers, decreasing the solidarity between them and 
their associations. 
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 Other variables often discussed as being important to workers in the social 
organization of work are job security and fair treatment.  Job security is important to 
ensure the workers ability to maintain their personal and family’s economic livelihoods.  In 
capitalists societies like the United States where workers’ healthcare, retirement, and 
economic livelihoods are tied directly to employment, the insecurity of losing these 
benefits is a source of stress and dissatisfaction (Sennett 1998).   Workers feel they receive 
fair treatment from employers when they are treated with respect and dignity and have 
some discretion in their overall work conditions.  Employers who respect workers in their 
organizations increase loyalty and relative productivity (Hodson 2001).  Workers who are 
allowed more autonomy in their labor production are generally more satisfied with their 
work than are workers who have their work dictated to them (Adams 2001).  Employers 
who bully workers to control work conditions can negatively affect the organization’s work 
experience, workers’ sense of security and self-worth, and inflict emotional damage 
(Ehrenreich 1999).   
 Job mobility is historically the NFL players’ prominent concern in labor market 
negotiations (Garvey 1979; Leeds and Allmen 2005).  Job mobility in the NFL is correlated 
to the players’ ability to freely move between teams to establish a competitive bidding 
market for their services, or “free agency”.  Players believe that if they are allowed to sell 
their services in an unrestricted free agent market they will increase the standards of their 
work and personal lives.  Free agency is also used as a promotional apparatus by players 
who develop their skills into a desired commodity to obtain a starting position with 
another team, choose their work location, or increase their bargaining leverage with 
current teams.  Research defends the players’ position and shows that restricted players 
16 
 
receive lower salaries, benefits, and relative work conditions than they could have achieved 
in a competitive market (Garvey 1979; Krautman, Allmen, and Berri 2009; Simmons and 
Berri 2009).  The players frequently demand the ability to “test the market” with free 
agency to receive fair compensation for their services.   
 Consequently, owners consistently resist free agency and players’ mobility to 
protect their interests of maintaining the league’s competitive balance and economic 
viability.  The commodity produced in professional team sports is “on the field” 
competition to sell as entertainment to consumers, or “fans.”  A sports league, like the NFL, 
needs its teams to remain profitable, stable, and economically viable to provide a 
consumable product year after year.  Fans associate with a particular team more than the 
entire league itself, so maintaining a consistent team base to maximize its relative fan base 
is important (Bishop, Finch, and Fromby 1990; Pivovarnik and Zuber 2004).  Fans also 
desire the league to have unpredictable and competitive games.  Winning teams draw more 
fan interest, but even teams that win on a routine basis find that fan interest declines 
proportionate to the predictability of the outcome (Pivovrnik and Zuber 2004).   
Maintaining competitive balance and team viability is difficult for a league without 
mechanisms to counteract the inequality apparent between its large market and small 
market teams. Larger markets allow more opportunities to increase revenue and 
operational income, which provides an intrinsic advantage to acquire better talent due to a 
larger budget to allocate on player salaries (Flynn and Gilbert 2001; Vrooman 1995).  
Presumably, large market teams could consume all the best available players and 
jeopardize the league’s competitive balance and game unpredictability.  Sports leagues use 
intra-team revenue share programs and restrictions on player mobility to offset the 
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inherent unequal market conditions of its teams so small market teams can remain 
competitive.  
 By far, the largest expense for any team is player costs (Brook and Fenn 2008; 
Leeds and Allmen 2005; Vrooman 1995).  Players represent roughly 45 to 70 percent of all 
operational costs for a particular team.  Player costs also represent the biggest risk for 
owners.  Evaluating player performance is not an exact science and teams routinely draft 
high priced talent that fall short of expectations.  Team owners also invest in developing 
promising players into “on the field” contributors.  Because owners expect to recoup a 
return on their investment, they seek to restrict player mobility so that players do not 
receive training and leave to play for another team (Brunkhorst and Fenn 2010).   
Team owners contend that controlling free agent mobility is a necessary and vital 
condition to ensure the overall success of the league.  The Coase Theorem (Coase 1960) 
suggests that whether free agency exists or not has no impact on the distribution of player 
talent within a league.6  The only difference lies in who reaps the rewards associated with a 
player’s services.  If a player owns his rights, he keeps the gains.  The opposite is true if a 
team owns his rights.  The law of diminishing returns suggests that a single owner would 
not sign all the best players because it would reduce the value of the investment.  The 
additional productive output of new players decreases because there is a fixed number of 
players who can participate in a game at any given time and a fixed number of specialized 
positions.  Thus, owners have an incentive to allow talent to be spread across the league.  It 
                                                          
6
 The Coase Theorem is an economic theory states that the initial allocation of property rights (whether a player 
has the right to sell his services to any team or whether the owner holds the rights to a player’s services) doesn’t 
matter.  As long as the property rights are clearly established and bargaining costs are low, the services will be put 
to use by the person or firm that benefits and values them the most.   
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doesn’t make economic or strategic sense for a single team to contract all the best players 
at any one position. 
 
Negotiated Order Theory: A Closer View 
 As I noted above, negotiated order theory was developed by Anslem Strauss in the 
1970s to conceptualize a general theory of negotiation.  If negotiated orders are a 
functional element of society, then a theoretical framework needed to be constructed to 
understand its dynamic implications.  The social order is better understood as a negotiated 
order because social actors pursuing competing agendas bargain, compromise, redefine, 
and produce and emerging sense of order as a stable, functional, and meaningful reality 
(Strauss 1978). 
 Negotiation is a means of getting things accomplished, making things work, or 
amending things so they continue to be functional.  Actors enter into negotiations with one 
another to reach a settlement over some matter.  Negotiation in this relationship has two 
primary effects (Strauss 1978: 4).  First, it focuses on a specific set of constraints, outcomes, 
and referents.  Every actor enters into negotiations with demands that it seeks from the 
interaction but is often limited by the arrangements of the particular social order within 
which it acts.  Second, bargaining requires the dominant coalition to assess alternative 
constraints, goals, and referents bearing on the given actor’s subjective interests.   The 
dominant actor is considered one who holds power and coercive influence over the social 
order, with a vested interest in its traditional arrangements, and is opposed to change.  
Strauss (1978) emphasizes the necessity to comprehend these structural contexts within 
which interactions between opposing actors take place in order to grasp the conditions 
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that influence the chosen modes of action.  Context here refers to the structural 
arrangements of an encompassing order larger than the other unit under focus, which is 
interaction.  Symbolic interactionists often fail to grasp these larger structural conditions 
and have the potential to overstate the framed interactions of social actors.    
In order to properly study negotiations, Strauss organized several directives that he 
felt were imperative.  First, negotiation theorists need to look at a much fuller range of 
negotiations (Strauss 1978:11).  Previous theorists’ attempts to explain negotiated orders 
as a process of social action are inadequate due to the topical focus of their investigations 
and specificity.  Negotiation is frequently treated as a sub-process of the larger systems but 
is rarely viewed as warranting a substantive theory of its own.   
Second, negotiated order theorists need to relate the negotiations to the modes of 
action available to social actors.  If there are alternative courses of action besides 
negotiation, then how does that possibility impact the negotiation process?  Negotiation 
processes are entwined with other social processes that must be studied together to gain a 
thorough understanding of the negotiation context.  For example, actors in a dominant 
position in a social order may choose not to negotiate relevant issues with subordinates 
due to the power their positions provide.  Corporate managers with monopoly power over 
the market do not need to negotiate fairly with employees because it controls the modes of 
production, available resources, and distribution networks (Clawson 2003).  The United 
States’ coal industry is a relevant example. 
Third, negotiation theorists need to look at particular negotiations in correlation to 
the larger structural conditions within which they operate.  Strauss (1978: 99) 
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distinguishes “between the larger, structural context and a negotiation context, where the 
latter refers specifically to the structural conditions that directly affect the course of the 
negotiation itself”.  In many social orders, the structural conditions are arranged so that 
certain kinds of negotiations are impossible or improbable, while still others are more 
frequent and permitted.  Workers often experience economic consequences from their 
specific industries because the competition and industrial process is exclusive to that 
industry (Sullivan 1990).  For instance, growth industries can offer better wages, benefits, 
incentives, and job security for workers as opposed to industries in decline (Galloway 
2005).  Workers negotiating better work conditions in a declining industry have less 
bargaining leverage than their growth industry counterparts.  The structural constraints of 
a particular industry can affect how actors view social orders and its arrangements.  Actors’ 
preconceived judgments can limit behaviors and reinforce limitations on the actions that 
are open or closed to them within those structures.  Thus, for any proper study of 
negotiation, both the micro-negotiation context and macro-structural context need to be 
analyzed, to comprehend the normative conditions of that environment. 
In understanding the structural framework of a particular negotiation researchers 
need to examine the structural context as if it were the background and operationalize the 
negotiation context in the foreground.  “The structural context is larger, more 
encompassing, than the negotiation context, but the lines of impact can run either way” 
(Strauss 1978: 101).  Focusing on both the macro-structural and micro-negotiation 
contexts will increase the likelihood that the specific courses of negotiation to be studied 
within the larger social structures are identified.  Observing the outcomes produced by the 
negotiations is vital and can contribute to recognizable patterns of change in the 
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negotiation contexts that may apply to future negotiations and impact the social order 
(Strauss 1978).  It is the “course” of the parties’ bargaining relationships and 
developmental natures that are the most relevant aspects for understanding the 
negotiation context and any effective resolutions. 
There are many specific kinds of negotiation contexts that pertain to the 
interactions between negotiating parties, but there exist several properties that can be 
applied to all (Strauss 1978).  A researcher needs to understand the number of negotiators, 
their experience levels, and whom they represent.  It is important to determine if the 
negotiations are one-shot, repeated, sequential, serial, multiple, or linked.  Also, a 
comprehension of the relative balance of power between the negotiating parties is required 
to understand their interactions.  Knowing the circumstantial power positions of the 
negotiators helps to conceptualize the nature of each party’s respective stakes in the 
negotiations.  Understanding if the interactions are covert or overt is necessary because the 
relative visibility of specific actions can greatly influence the behaviors and actions of the 
interested parties.  A researcher needs to appreciate the number and complexity of related 
issues being negotiated to ascertain the effectiveness of the negotiation in producing 
preferred ends.  Finally, understanding the available options to either party in the 
negotiations that could affect their ability and preference to negotiate is a primary concern. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
My research investigates the negotiation strategies employed by players in the NFL 
labor market case study using Strauss’s negotiated order theory.  The tension between the 
team owners’ need for a stable environment to achieve competitive balance and the 
players’ insistence on change to acquire free agency informs my research.  My main goals 
are to understand (1) why players decertify from the NFLPA and (2) whether this action 
results in more advantages for players than conventional collective bargaining.  Content 
analyses of the players’ lawsuits during the decertification period of 1989-1993 and 
subsequent CBA extensions of the 1993 agreement provide counterfactual data to make 
inferences to these questions.   
 
Understanding the Variables 
 Examining the differences between class action lawsuits and collective bargaining in 
labor markets is difficult because these unique strategies are performed under distinct 
normative arrangements.  Class action lawsuits deal primarily with antitrust laws and 
court litigation.  Collective bargaining operates under federal labor laws and uses 
gamesmanship tactics to gain leverage in contract negotiations.  To overcome this 
limitation, I followed Anslem Strauss’s advice.  Strauss suggests that the normative 
conditions affect the actions of the negotiating parties in 4 ways: (1) aims they pursue, (2) 
alternative modes of action, (3) tactics during negotiations, and (4) outcomes (Strauss, 
1979).   
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 I classify my objects of interest, decertified class action lawsuits and collective 
bargaining, as alternative modes of action, or strategies, employed by players to obtain 
positive outcomes in the labor market. I treat each strategy as a separate entity and 
evaluate the outcomes that each generates within in its own procedural constraints.  In this 
manner I avoid the bias of holding lawsuits to the same standards as collective bargaining 
or vice versa.  By focusing on the aims that negotiating parties pursue through each mode 
and the outcomes offered by each, I can understand their effects on the current 
arrangements of the labor market. 
 I chose not to examine the tactics used during the negotiations for several reasons.  
First, the actual influence of the tactics is hard to determine.  Second, because the tactics for 
the two modes are distinct, they cannot be adequately compared.  Third, the actual tactics 
are not essential to my plan to examine the outcomes of the two strategies. Although 
specific tactics associated with each mode of action affect the negotiation process and alter 
the short-term conditions of the labor arrangements, analyzing them would be more 
appropriate for a within-mode rather than a between-mode study.  Testing my hypotheses 
does not require inspecting these details, only the outcomes of the chosen strategies.  
Fourth, tactics employed in each mode are discussed in the historical narrative and provide 
contextual understanding of their significance in the NFL labor market.  For these reasons, 
tactics, as variables to be examined, are excluded from the research in this thesis.   
  
Status Quo 
 Several time periods could represent the baseline arrangements to compare the 
collective bargaining and decertification strategies.  I could establish the status quo as the 
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market conditions existing when the NFL officially organized in 1923, using the complete 
monopsony structure of an unfettered reserve system.  Similarly, I could choose 1970, the 
first year of the NFL and AFL merger and the owners’ acceptance of the NFLPA as the sole 
bargaining representative of the NFL players.  Several significant court cases occurred 
during the 1970s that led the NFL and NFLPA to forge commitments to each other with the 
original CBAs.  However, the litigation in the 1970s did not follow decertification.  The 
rulings are historically significant and establish precedence, but do not align with the intent 
of my research.  I view the 1970s-era CBAs in the same fashion.  Though relevant to my 
discussion, the 1970s CBAs were negotiated under different market conditions and 
arrangements than those in the late 1980s, when decertification first occurred.  To analyze 
how decertification and CBAs affect the labor market, I need to examine the variables 
under similar conditions. 
For this thesis, I use 1986 as the baseline status quo for the players’ situation in the 
NFL labor market.  I do this for several reasons:   
1. The failure of the 1987 CBA negotiations and players’ strike ended with no official 
CBA.  Consequently, the league defaulted to the standards of the 1982 CBA.  The 
1986 NFL labor market conditions are the last year before decertification that the 
league operated under a negotiated CBA.  Thus, it seems a logical starting point to 
measure the outcomes of my variables.   
2. The NFLPA decertified in 1989 to seek better bargaining position through litigation 
as a direct result of the 1987 CBA negotiations’ failure.  The NFLPA was recertified 
in 1993.  From 1989 to 1993 the union didn’t represent the players because of 
decertification.  Therefore, 1989 to 1993 represents a measurable time period 
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when decertified class action lawsuits were the only mode of action officially used 
by players in negotiations.   
3. The 1993 CBA has been extended four times: 1996, 1998, 2002, and 2006.  Each 
extension offers an opportunity to study collective bargaining in the NFL labor 
market because the conditions and arrangements operate under the same basic 
guidelines offered in the 1993 CBA.  Amendments made to each extension of the 
1993 CBA are measurable as changes in the status quo and as negotiated outcomes.   
4. In 2008, the owners opted out of the 2006 version of the 1993 CBA.  This action led 
to the 2011 NFLPA decertification after new contract negotiations stalled and the 
1993 CBA officially expired.  The 1993 CBA and subsequent extensions act as the 
only standard arrangements of the NFL labor market after the NFLPA’s first 
decertification and prior to its second.   
 
Measuring the Variables 
 I conducted two separate tests to evaluate the strategies.  The first analysis studies 
the effects of antitrust lawsuits on the NFL labor market during the decertified time period 
between 1989 and 1993.  The second analysis examines the effects of collective bargaining 
beginning with the 1993 CBA and ending in 2008 when the owners opted out of the CBA.   
The 1993 CBA is critical because the agreement is a product of the courtroom litigation that 
preceded it from 1989 to 1993.   Because the lawsuits impact the negotiations of the 1993 
CBA, roughly equivalent market conditions exist for both analyses.   
 I will measure the outcomes of each strategy as gains or losses in the labor market 
situations of players against the status quo.   Gains are evaluated as positive increases in 
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players’ work conditions using four categories of analysis: (1) player mobility, (2) league 
revenue share to be allocated for players’ salaries and benefits, (3) job security, and (4) 
impartial dispute resolution.  Mobility concerns a player’s ability to act as a free agent while 
entering and playing in the league; free agency would permit players to negotiate contracts 
with other teams in a competitive market to seek the highest salary, work conditions, 
employment location, and chosen employer.  Players’ portion of the league’s revenue share 
is regarded as the percentage of the NFL’s gross revenue for a particular season.  The 
percentage is based on an estimate of the league’s projected earnings for that season and 
comprises all monies allocated to players for salaries, prorated bonuses, and benefits.  
Benefits in the NFL are viewed as post-career financial plans that address four main 
categories: severance pay, annuities, second career plans, and retirement savings plans.  
Players and their families are covered by a league-wide insurance plan while in the NFL so 
the benefits program is not applied to actual current players.  For my research, job security 
is interpreted to mean a player’s ability to sign a guaranteed contract, refuse an unwanted 
trade, and the minimum requirements to become a vested NFL player in order to receive 
full benefits and veteran protections.  Impartial dispute resolution deals with a player’s 
ability to seek arbitration from a third party that is external to the NFL Commissioner’s 
Office in matters concerning labor disputes, discipline, and contract agreements.   
 Losses are evaluated as negative decreases in the same four categories.  When no 
changes occur in the labor market conditions as a result of either negotiation strategy, then 
the status quo will be considered maintained without a positive or negative effect. 
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Class Action Lawsuits 
 During 1989 to 1993 there were three significant lawsuits filed on behalf of players 
against the NFL.  Other minor lawsuits were filed, but each case either failed to reach a 
ruling or was deferred to one of the three lawsuits examined in this thesis.  The three cases 
were Powell v. NFL (1989), McNeil v. NFL (1992), and White v. NFL (1993).       
 I obtained court transcripts for the cases using two sources, the Lexis-Nexis archival 
database and LegalFind.com, to examine the individual lawsuits.  I examined the transcripts 
in three ways.  First, I identified the claims of the initial lawsuits for a contextual 
understanding of their intents, applicable laws, and which status quo arrangement they 
brought into question.  Second, I interpreted the court rulings and concluding opinions on 
the players’ work conditions using my four categories of study.  I marked any changes to 
those conditions as a result of the court rulings.  In many of the cases, the district court’s 
rulings were appealed to a higher court.  I investigated these appellate court transcripts in 
the same manner as the lower court transcripts to maintain consistency in my research.  
Finally, I used the 1993 CBA as a standard to compare the outcomes of the decertification 
strategy, examining the changes between the initial status quo of 1986 and the 1993 
agreement.    
 
Collective Bargaining 
For my investigation into collective bargaining, I began with the 1993 CBA and 
included each negotiated extension (1996, 1998, 2002, and 2006).  I used the NFLPA 
website to obtain copies of the 1993 CBA and each extension agreement 
(www.NFLPlayers.com).  By examining each CBA, I was able to evaluate outcome changes 
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by assessing the standard arrangements existing prior to each bargaining period compared 
to the accepted conditions of each extension.  Again, I coded the results using the four 
categories of players’ work conditions to ascertain any changes to the status quo.  In order 
to gain a precise understanding of players’ demands entering each bargaining period, I 
used relevant news articles, press releases, and scholarly journal publications found online 
with Google, Lexis-Nexis archival database, and the NFLPA website.  Understanding what 
the players sought during each bargaining period allowed me to examine the effectiveness 
of the negotiations for players.  The sources were not used to interpret opposing 
viewpoints of the NFL or NFLPA during negotiations, only the actual demands being sought 
by the players at the time of each bargaining period.   
 
Other Sources 
Finally, obtaining financial information on the NFL or individual teams is extremely 
difficult.  All NFL teams except the Green Bay Packers are privately held and are not 
obligated to disclose financial records.  To verify the accuracy of my collected data, 
especially concerning the collective bargaining analysis, I used “The Economics of NFL 
Team Ownership” (Murphy and Topel 2009) and Forbes annual reports on the financial 
conditions of the NFL from 1996-2008.  “The Economics of NFL Team Ownership” was a 
report prepared for the NFLPA that was distributed to players during the 2009 Super Bowl.  
It examines the NFL owners’ claims that they could not continue to operate under the 2006 
amended version of the 1993 CBA.  It was prepared for the NFLPA by Dr. Kevin M. Murphy 
and Dr. Robert H. Topel, professors of economics at the Booth School of Business at The 
University of Chicago.  The Forbes data are published in an annual report containing 
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information on individual franchise values, revenue, operating income, debt, player 
expenses, and gate receipts.  The Forbes reports are cited in numerous scholarly journals 
and recognized as a reliable source for this information.  Prior to 1996, the now defunct 
Financial World published the same NFL report before Forbes succeeded it.   The Financial 
World data, though cited in several journal articles, was not obtainable and was not 
considered for the purpose my research.  This should not prove to be a major issue because 
the Forbes data cover all but the first three years of the collective bargaining period and 
began publication the same year of the first CBA extension.   
 
30 
 
CHAPTER 4 
THE NEGOTIATED ORDER OF THE NFL 
Applicable Laws 
Sherman Antitrust Act 
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is the most commonly cited grievance in NFL 
lawsuits.  It was ratified to eliminate unfair competitive advantages obtained by cartels or 
monopolies (also known as “trusts”) in the market.7  It focuses upon ensuring fair market 
competition and requires the federal government to intervene when violations exist.  The 
act seeks to eliminate artificial pricing schemes that increase or decrease market values by 
restricting trade or supply.  The U.S. Supreme Court gave more clarity to the Act’s purpose 
in Spectrum Sports, Inc v. McQuillan:8 
  The purpose of the Sherman Act is not to protect businesses from the working  
  of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the market.  The law 
  directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against 
  conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself. 
 
 There are two main sections to the Sherman Act that are most applicable to 
antitrust lawsuits.  Section 1 prohibits specific means of anticompetitive conduct.  It states, 
“every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”9  
Section 1 violations are considered “per se” violations, which are obvious constraints on 
competition and recognized as consistent actions that would always contribute to the 
restraint of trade.  The court definition is any action that is found to have a “pernicious 
                                                          
7
 Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, Pub. L. No. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7). 
8
 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (U.S.C. 1993). 
9
 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
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effect on competition” and “lacks any redeeming virtue.”10  Thus, any actions that 
deliberately create monopoly conditions and serve no purpose other than to cause these 
conditions are in violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.   
Section 2 focuses on the end results of market activities that are anticompetitive in 
nature.  It states, “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade 
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony…”11  Section 2 violations fall under the “rule of reason” and are applied in two ways.  
First, it must be proved that a possession of monopoly power in the relevant market exits 
and survives a “burden of proof” place upon the defendant.  Second, the willful acquisition 
or maintenance of that monopoly power is deemed not to be developed as a consequence 
of a “natural monopoly” created by a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.   The court analyzes if “facts peculiar to the business, the history of the 
questionable action, and the reasons why it is implemented,” to assess the restraints on 
competition in the relevant product market.12  In essence, if an action appears to have an 
anticompetitive effect on the market using logical economic reason, beyond the burden of 
proof, then it is considered a trade violation. 
The Clayton Act of 1914 extended the provisions of the Sherman Act to specific 
actions of misconduct like price discrimination between different purchasers, exclusive 
dealing arrangements, and merger acquisitions that substantially reduce market 
                                                          
10
 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977) (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 
U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). 
11
 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
12
 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylavania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977) (citing United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 
U.S. 495, 5 19 (1948)). 
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competition as illegal activities.13  The Clayton Act also provided a labor exemption clause 
that allowed unions exemption from antitrust liability.14  It allows unions and owners to 
enter into agreements that may create monopolistic practices regarding the working 
conditions of the workers it represents. Another amendment offered by the Clayton Act 
required the trebling of all damages awarded to plaintiffs in antitrust lawsuits. 
 
Nonstatutory Labor Exemption    
 The non-statutory labor exemption immunizes certain union and employer 
agreements from antitrust scrutiny.  Under such agreements, actions that would be found 
to violate antitrust laws can be permitted if negotiated and accepted in CBAs.  The courts 
often defer to applicable labor laws that favor collective bargaining to judicial intervention 
in labor market disputes.  In practice, nearly all management and union agreements 
bargained in good faith receive protection from antitrust laws.  Antitrust laws become 
applicable only when either party has performed an unfair labor practice or when 
negotiations reach an impasse.  All other matters fall under the jurisdiction of the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB). 
 
The National Labor Relations Act 
 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 established the guidelines by 
which collective bargaining relations are determined.15  The main tenet of NLRA is the duty 
                                                          
13
 Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (codified U.S.C. §§ 52-53). 
14
 Prior to the Theodore Roosevelt administration, the Sherman Act was more commonly used against union 
activities in bargaining than corporate trusts.  Strikes and boycotts were considered unfair labor practice violations. 
15
 NLRA (also known as the Wagner Act) of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 151-69). 
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to bargain in good faith in an attempt to foster industrial peace between management and 
labor.  The NLRA demands that all parties should “meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.”16  
These criteria are considered mandatory subjects of bargaining because they directly 
impact workplace conditions.17  The collective bargaining process is based on several 
tactics, including aspects employed by either party to exert economic pressures upon the 
other during negotiations.  These tools of economic pressure are used to gain bargaining 
leverage and are considered perfectly legal measures, including lockouts and strikes.18    
The NLRA focused upon employers and their common refusal to bargain with 
workers in labor market negotiations, constituting an unfair labor practice.19  The act states 
that there is only a duty to bargain in good faith and does not define the parameters of 
what constitutes a lack of good faith bargaining.  Defining a lack of good faith was left to the 
NLRB and federal courts.  The Supreme Court said the purpose of the act was to provide a 
vehicle for the “free opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives of 
employees…and to promote industrial peace”.20   
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 provided clearer definition to the concept of “good 
faith”, stating that employers and employee organizations must meet and confer with an 
open mind and with true intent of reaching an agreement.  There is no requirement that the 
parties reach an agreement, only that each party attempts to negotiate one.  If one party 
                                                          
16
 29 U.S.C. §158 (d). 
17
 The topics of workplace conditions are more expansive than this and can include retirement benefits, arbitration 
mandates, legal liability clauses, internal union matters, etc.  
18
 In Am. Ship Bldg. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 310 it was written that “there is nothing in the statute which would 
imply that the right to strike ‘carries with it’ the right exclusively to determine the timing and duration of all work 
stoppages.  Thus, lockouts are legal actions to be used by owners/managers. 
19
 NLRA, Section 158(a)(5). 
20
 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-47 (1937). 
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can prove that the other has not negotiated with the intent to find a solution, the bargaining 
can be declared to have reached an impasse. 
 
History of the Reserve System 
As research of the NFL labor market history suggests, the owners have held superior 
bargaining leverage and maintained monopsony power over the players by implementing 
the reserve system.  The reserve system was developed by team owners in closed-door 
meetings, without critique of the players, the courts, or Congress (Leeds and Allmen 2005). 
It consists of five main elements: (1) the selection of players or “draft”, (2) the retention of 
players, (3) discipline and control of players, (4) dispute resolution, and (5) ability to sell 
and trade players (Garvey 1979).  Each structure is considered by the owners to be a 
necessary aspect to maintain a league’s economic viability and guarantee a competitive 
product.  Though there are five elements to the reserve system only three have major 
significance to the labor market: the draft, the retention of players, and control over 
discipline and dispute resolution.  The ability to sell and trade players coincides with the 
mechanisms used for player retention, such as the standard players’ contract, ownership 
rights to players’ services, and restrictions on players’ mobility.21  Disciplinary control and 
dispute resolution are both organized under the jurisdiction of the NFL Commissioner’s 
Office and operate in similar fashions, so they are combined in this study.   
                                                          
21
 The practice of trading players is accepted in all leagues and allows teams to trade a player to another team at a 
moment’s notice without his discretion.  The player has no choice but to report to his new team, regardless of the 
location or working conditions, or end his participation in the league.  The NFL has resisted the exchanging of 
players for cash payments that other sports leagues accept.  MLB allows player for cash trades because it acts as a 
form of revenue share, where small market teams are subsidized by large market teams by consuming higher 
salaried player contracts.  The NFL views this practice as counterproductive to ensuring competitive balance.   
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 The reverse order draft is the foundational component to the reserve system 
because it allows owners to control the entrance, distribution, and salaries of players into 
the league (Garvey 1979).  It grants a particular team owner the exclusive rights to 
negotiate a contract with a drafted player and the ability to control competitive balance 
and minimize salaries from the beginning of a player’s career (Fort and Quirk 1995; Garvey 
1979; Leeds and Allmen 2005; Levine and Maravent 2010).  The reverse order draft allows 
the worst teams the previous season the ability to strengthen their rosters with the best 
collegiate talent to become more competitive in the league at a reduced cost.22  According 
to the NFL Constitution, in order to gain entrance into the league each player must 
participate in the draft process no earlier than three years after graduating from high 
school.  A player’s initial salary is set at a fixed rate based on the previous year’s signings of 
players selected in a similar draft position.  For example, quarterback Cam Newton was 
viewed as the number one collegiate prospect entering the 2011 Draft.  Without a draft, 
Newton could negotiate a contract with any team in an open market.  He could choose his 
team/location and expect a higher salary as each team bids against the other for his 
services.  Newton was selected with the first overall pick by the Carolina Panthers in the 
draft.  His initial contract will be based on the parameters established by the first overall 
pick of the 2010 draft, and though substantial, will be presumably less than what he could 
have received in a competitive market. 
 The draft was ruled an illegal violation of the Sherman Act in 1976 because it acted 
as a group boycott when NFL owners refused to deal with players before the draft or after 
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 Evaluating player talent and potential is not a science.   A high draft choice is not a guarantee that the player will 
be effective in the NFL. 
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they were drafted by another team.23  Under the rule of reason, the draft exhibited an 
unreasonable restraint of trade that exceeded the legitimate goals of the NFL.  The plaintiff, 
James “Yazoo” Smith, was awarded $276,000 in trebled damages.24  Despite the court’s 
ruling, the draft remained active in the league’s status quo arrangement because it was 
bargained into the subsequent CBA.  It remains an issue for collective bargaining and must 
be accepted into each new CBA or extension by the bargaining parties.  The draft has 
become a secondary area of negotiations and rarely surfaces as an issue, except in antitrust 
lawsuits brought by players against the NFL and the reserve system.   
 The second structure of the reserve system addresses the retention of players to 
specific teams, or “the restriction of free agency”.  In the NFL labor market this remains one 
of the two main issues negotiated between the owners and players.  The restriction of free 
agency has evolved from the original reserve clause, then the Rozelle Rule, Plan B free 
agency, and eventual salary-capped free agency.  The reserve clause was structured into 
the standard player’s contract that every player signed as a stipulation to enter into the 
league.  Once signed, the contract could be terminated by the team at any moment, but a 
player was locked into the contract.  At the end of the initial contract, typically five seasons, 
the players’ team reserved the option to sign the player for an extension.  An extension was 
for a fixed salary amount, normally 10% less than the original contract in the NFL (Garvey 
1979).  The team retained the rights to the player’s services, so players realistically did not 
                                                          
23
 Yazoo Smith v. Professional Sports, 593 F.2d 1173 (8
th
 Cir. 1976). 
24
 Smith was an All-American player for the Oregon Ducks and was drafted by the Washington Redskins in 1968.  
He played one season in the NFL before being severely injured in the final game of the 1969 season.  Smith 
received an initial salary of $22,000, plus bonuses worth approximately $20,000.  To award damages, District Judge 
Bryant calculated Smith’s annual “free market salary” from the annual salary received by a free agent at the same 
position signed by the Redskins the same year ($54,000).  All relevant bonus structures and payments already 
received were considered and concluded that Smith was eligible for $92,000 in damages, which is trebled in 
accordance to antitrust laws to contrive the full damage amount of $276,000. 
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have the option to sign with another club and had no choice but to accept the offer made by 
the only team that could employ him (Garvey, 1979).  Under the constraints of the reserve 
clause and perpetual one year options offered by owners, players often played for the same 
team their entire careers.  They had little discretion to bargain for higher salaries, 
employment conditions, or even their chosen employer.   
 The NFLPA began negotiating for players in 1956 when players of the Green Bay 
Packers and Cleveland Browns formed a union to demand a minimum league wide-salary, 
per diem pay for road games, uniforms, and equipment.25  Players also sought injury pay 
when they sustained football related injuries and could not play the following season.  The 
court ruled in Radovich, that the NFL was not exempt from antitrust scrutiny which made a 
majority of the reserve system’s anti-competitive behaviors illegal.  Fearful of other 
lawsuits, the owners granted most of players’ demands including: minimum salaries and 
benefits, rank and file pay structure for veterans, and player insurance.  Owners refused to 
recognize the NFLPA as the players’ bargaining representative.   
In 1962, Pete Rozelle became the NFL Commissioner and introduced the 
compensation clause as an amendment to the NFL Constitution.26   At the completion of a 
player’s initial contract, he could become a free agent and had the option to sign with his 
existing team or to negotiate with another team.  Any team that signed a free agent player 
had to compensate the original team with cash payouts, other players, or draft choices.   If 
the two teams could not agree upon fair compensation, the commissioner would decree 
what was fair.  The commissioner’s job was to reduce the free movement of players 
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 The status quo in 1956 was for players to provide their own uniforms and equipment, including the maintenance 
of it, and receive no per diems or salary floor. 
26
 The compensation clause is generally referred to as the “Rozelle Rule”.   
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between teams so the compensation was set unrealistically high to discourage teams from 
signing free agents (Garvey, 1979).  As a result of the new system, only 34 players changed 
teams via free agency over the 15 years that the Rozelle Rule was implemented (Leeds and 
Allmen, 2005). 
 John Mackay of the Baltimore Colts filed a class action suit against the Rozelle Rule 
in 1975.27 The courts ruled in the players’ favor and declared the Rozelle Rule to a group 
boycott in violation of the Sherman Act.  The 8th Circuit Court rejected the owners’ appeal 
that the Rozelle Rule was exempt due to the nonstatutory labor exemption but declined to 
follow the district court’s ruling.  Instead, the court suggested that the two parties were 
better suited to ensure their mutual interests than the courts and should negotiate to 
resolve the dispute.   
 After a brief 15-day strike in 1968, the NFLPA effectively negotiated its first CBA, 
but concessions were small.28  The CBA was short lived and ended when the NFL merged 
with the AFL in 1970.  The NFLPA’s CBA was usurped by the agreement between the AFL 
players and team owners, which offered fewer concessions.29  As a condition to the reduced 
agreement, the NFLPA was recognized as the players’ sole bargaining representative and 
successfully petitioned the NLRB for union certification (Levine and Maravent 2010).   
The NFLPA contended that many of the bargaining issues should have been 
conceded by owners after Radovich, like the elimination of the draft, the option clause, 
Rozelle Rule, impartial arbitration, and the waiver system, but to no avail (Garvey 1979).  
The NFLPA had accepted the reserve conditions in the 1968 CBA and again in the 1970 
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 Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8
th
 Cir. 1976). 
28
 The players received a $1.5 million pension fund, but no increases in the minimum rookie salary of $9,000, 
veteran salary floor of $10,000, or independent arbitration, which had been sought. 
29
 The players’ pension fund was reduced to $85,000 and no minimum rookie salary. 
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NFL/AFL merged CBA and failed to successfully implement the court rulings into a 
bargained agreement.  As a consequence, the NFLPA struggled to bargain for players’ 
demands in the 1972 negotiations and the season began without a contractual agreement 
and a players’ strike.  The owners reacted by performing a lockout of veteran players and 
only invited rookies and non-NFL free agents to training camp.  After a month, more than 
25 percent of all veteran players crossed the picket lines, leaving the union badly split and 
underfunded.  The only concession the players received was an increase to the players’ 
pension fund to $19.1 million.   
The NFLPA failed to capitalize on the 1970s court rulings as well.  The 1977 CBA had 
little effect on the reserve system and resulted in a watered down version of the Rozelle 
Rule, called Plan B free agency.  Under Plan B free agency, teams reserved the rights to 37 
players out of a 45-man roster.30  Reserved players were not allowed to be true free agents 
and were deemed protected under Rozelle Rule provisions.  If a reserved free agent was 
offered a contract by another team, the original team was granted the right to first refusal 
or to match the offer of the other club.  If the original team chose not to match the offer, the 
signing club had to provide draft choices as compensation (Leeds and Allmen, 2005; Levine 
and Maravent, 2010).  Unprotected players were permitted to negotiate with a team of 
their choice, which allowed marginal players to secure larger contracts and move freely 
between teams while better players remained restricted.  Marquee players fared the same 
under this system as under the Rozelle Rule, which made it all but impossible for them to 
move between teams in a competitive market. The players still lacked the unfettered free 
agency they valued and coveted most.  On average 125 players per year sought free agency 
                                                          
30
 Teams protected the most talented players, but released the least skilled players on their rosters. 
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from 1977-1988, but only 3 players changed teams; fewer than 50 out of 600 players 
received offers from other teams after becoming free agents (Fort and Quirk, 1995). 
As the 1982 CBA negotiations approached, players showed increasing signs of 
solidarity in an attempt to overcome the stranglehold owners had on the labor market.  The 
NFLPA changed its focus from free agency to a larger share of the revenue pool generated 
by the NFL.  The NFLPA sought 55 percent of the league’s total revenue to be allocated to 
player salaries and benefits and a compensation plan structured on years of service, 
playing time, and individual/team performance (Levine and Maravent 2010).  The owners 
preferred a performance-based bonus salary structure without seniority considerations 
and contended the players already received 48 percent of the revenue share.  The NFL’s 
long-term financial viability became a focus of the negotiations, though the owners refused 
to disclose their financial records.  The NFLPA challenged the owners’ refusal to provide 
information as an unfair labor practice and inability to bargain in good faith to the NLRB 
without success.31  The NLRB stated the NFLPA had “no definitive basis” to warrant a 
demand of 55 percent of the revenue share.  This decision led to the predictable outcome of 
a players’ strike and an owners’ lockout.  Owners offered veteran players with at least three 
games played into their fourth season “money now” bonuses if a new CBA was signed.  By 
November, the CBA was signed.  The players received their bonuses worth a total of $60 
million and realized increases in the salary floor, pension, and preseason pay. 
The players elected Gene Upshaw, a former all-pro NFL player, in 1983 to be the 
new Executive Director of the NFLPA.  As his first action as head of the union, Upshaw 
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conducted a league-wide players’ poll to assess the needs and wants of the current players.  
Player mobility remained the highest priority (Levine and Maravent 2010).  Hearing the 
players’ demands, Upshaw made free agency his number one agenda heading into the 1987 
negotiations.   
Owners immediately rejected the players’ demands stating that free agency would 
disrupt the league’s competitive balance and ability to remain economically viable.  Owners 
prepared for a possible work stoppage by tentatively hiring replacement players at $1,000 
per game and secured a $1.5 billion line of credit from banks using their television 
contracts as collateral.  The NFLPA understood that a strike would be ineffective if owners 
were willing to play games using replacement players, but the players ignored the 
suggestion and voted to strike.  The owners’ strategy significantly limited the NFLPA’s 
bargaining leverage because the owners actually increased their teams’ profitability by 
preparing to pay replacement players lower wages while reaping the rewards of their 
lucrative television contracts.   
The strike became contentious, not between players and owners, but between the 
players themselves.  Two weeks into the strike veteran players began to cross the picket 
lines including star players like Steve Largent, Ed “Too Tall” Jones, and Jim Kelly.  Players 
solidarity broke down and three weeks later the strike ended without a CBA or any new 
concessions granted to players.   
The NFLPA decided that collective bargaining was a futile effort at that juncture and 
reverted to litigation as a way to seek bargaining leverage against the owners.  The NFLPA’s 
class action lawsuit challenged the league’s Plan B system as a violation of Section 1 of the 
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Sherman Act.32  The NFL, on behalf of the owners, filed a motion stating that free agency 
was a topic for collective bargaining and was exempt from antitrust scrutiny by the 
nonstatutory labor exemption suggested in Mackey.  The court ruling favored the owners 
declaring that the nonstatutory labor exemption did exempt Plan B free agency because it 
had been negotiated into a CBA, even if the agreement had expired.  The court deferred to 
the NLRB on whether an impasse had been reached.  The NFL filed a claim proposing the 
NFLPA refusal to bargain in good faith by choosing to litigate.  The NLRB declared that an 
impasse had been reached and the lawsuit was allowed to continue.  On appeal, the courts 
agreed to the impasse but refused to issue an injunction believing that such a measure 
would undermine the collective bargaining process.  As a final decree, the 8th Circuit Court 
of Appeals’s majority decision held that the nonstatutory labor exemption did protect the 
league and Plan B from antitrust scrutiny.  In dissent, Justice Gerald Heaney wrote: 
 …the majority purports to reject the owners’ argument that the labor exemption in this case  
continues indefinitely.  The practical effects of the majority’s opinion, however, is just that – 
because the labor exemption will continue until the bargaining relationship is terminated 
either by the NLRB decertification proceeding or by abandonment of the bargaining rights of 
the union.33  
 
Justice Heaney suggested that the players should disband the NFLPA as a union so that the 
nonstatutory labor exemption no longer applied.  The players chose to follow Justice 
Heaney’s advice and voted to decertify the NFLPA as a union and its bargaining 
representative on November 3, 1989.  This action opened the door for player-initiated class 
action lawsuits against the NFL and the reserve system status quo.   
  The final element of the reserve system that affects the balance of power is the 
operative maintenance and administrative authority granted to the commissioner in the 
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NFL Constitution.  The owners feared a Congressional oversight committee would 
intervene in league affairs without a demonstrable mechanism to ensure that the players’ 
and fans’ interests were being served by the NFL.  The owners appointed a league 
commissioner to fulfill this superficial function and ensure that the owners’ interests were 
protected, nurtured, and effectively implemented.  Instead of an external regulator, the 
owners had an internal agent to oversee the day to day operations of the NFL.   
The commissioner has three major duties: (1) protect and promote league interests, 
(2) manage labor relations, and (3) act as judiciary control over all league matters (Garvey 
1979).  For the owners, the most important duty of the commissioner is to ensure the 
league’s profitability and sustainable growth.  Rozelle worked diligently to create a “league 
think” mentality with the owners.  Under his plan, large market teams would sacrifice short 
term profit goals for the sake of long-term revenue sharing schemes that would ensure 
league-wide growth and financial prosperity.34  Rozelle’s successor, Paul Tagliabue, 
furthered the group think mentality in the 1980s and 90s with his stadium renovation and 
construction program that continued to increase league profits.   
The NFL has the most aggressive form of intra-team revenue share in professional 
sports.  It is the only league that equally shares television contract revenue from the major 
networks and cable affiliations.  A study in 2005 showed that share of television revenue 
fully pays the operational costs of many small market NFL teams, which allows them to 
remain viable and produce a competitive product (Conlin and Emerson 2005).  The NFL 
also has the most egalitarian visitor’s gate receipt policy.  Gate receipts include all monies 
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derived from game day tickets but does not include stadium concessions, fan club 
programs, luxury suites, or parking fees (Leeds and Allmen 2005).  The NFL’s shared gate 
revenue is split 60/40 for every game, with the home team receiving 60 percent and the 
visiting team 40 percent.  Comparatively, MLB has two gate receipt policies.  The National 
League (NL) exchanges at a 90/10 rate and the American League (AL) shares at a rate of 
80/20.  The NBA and NHL have no gate revenue share policies and the home team receives 
the entire take.  
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CHAPTER 5 
FINDINGS 
1986 Status Quo 
For my research, I established the status quo of the players’ labor market situation 
as the standards that existed in 1986.  Using my four criteria of analysis, I determined the 
initial status quo as the following: (1) player mobility was controlled under Plan B free 
agency and realistically offered players little free agency.  The players lacked the ability to 
change teams to seek the best work conditions, salaries, or employer.  All players entered 
the league through the draft and weren’t eligible until three years after their high school 
graduating class.   (2) The players received 49 percent of the league revenue compensated 
in the forms of salaries, bonuses, and personal benefits (Vrooman 2011).  In 1986, 87 
percent of the players’ share was allocated to salaries and bonuses, while 13 percent was 
used to cover retirement benefits.  The median average player salary was $198,000, 
including prorated bonuses.  (3) Job security was relatively weak.  Only 3 percent of players 
in the entire league had guaranteed salaries for the 1986 season (Hachlin 2008).  A 
majority of those players were on the teams’ practice squads and only 11 active roster 
players had a guaranteed salary.   Players had no discretion or recourse if a team traded 
them.  The owner retained complete control over the rights to a player under contract and 
could trade him without warning or justification.  Players became vested in the NFL after 
six full seasons on an NFL roster, or 96 games at 16 games per season.  If injured during the 
course of a season, players were said to have played a full credited season if they were on 
the active roster for eight games over the course of the season.   (4)  Due to statutes in the 
standard player’s contract, a player forgoes any right to an external arbitrator and allows 
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the NFL Commissioner to act as judge and jury over all league matters.  If a player had a 
grievance with a team or condition of employment or sought to appeal a disciplinary action 
taken by a team or the league against him, he could not express his complaints to an 
outside arbitrator.  All conflicts were presented before the commissioner for resolution.  
Also, the commissioner retained veto power over all player contracts to ensure that they 
complied with league standards.   
 
Decertification Period (1989-1993) 
 All three of the lawsuits studied in my research directly addressed the NFL’s 
restraints on players’ mobility as they enter and play in the league.  The Powell lawsuit was 
filed before decertification was recognized and was judged on the precedent of earlier 
court rulings where the courts ruled that “the labor exemption would continue to shield the 
existing system of player restraints until the parties reach an impasse in negotiations.”35  
The courts wrote that, “defendants (owners) were protected from plaintiffs’ (players’) 
antitrust allegations up until the point of impasse and since impasse was not found until 
June 17, 1988, plaintiffs’ claims for antitrust damages regarding the right of first 
refusal/compensation system before that date are without merit.”36   
In McNeil v. NFL, eight players directly attacked the Plan B system of free agency as 
an unreasonable restraint on trade that affected their ability to earn top salaries compared 
with players in other professional sports.  The jurors sided with the players on three of four 
issues: (1) Plan B had a “harmful effect” on competition, (2) Plan B was more restrictive 
than it needed to be, (3) and players suffered economic injury due to Plan B free agency.  
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Plan B free agency was ruled to be a violation of antitrust laws and, thus, an illegal restraint 
of trade in a competitive market.   The owners succeeded on how much Plan B contributed 
to competitive balance in the NFL and the inherent need to maintain competitive balance in 
a sports industry.      
 In McNeil, the courts recognized the decertification of the NFLPA and ended the 
owners’ antitrust protection from antitrust lawsuits provided by the nonstatutory labor 
exemption.  The court referred to rulings in Powell and Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, which 
declared that the termination of the collective bargaining relationship did not establish a 
“new principle of law” because decertification is a common practice with legal 
precedents.37   The court continued that the dissenting opinions in Powell foreshadowed 
the current arrangements of the McNeil case.  Although the majority in Powell declined to 
pick the exact point at which the labor exemption would end, they acknowledged that the 
bargaining relationship could be terminated and thus the owners’ protections.   
The defendants contended that the 8th Circuit’s opinion in Powell did not address the 
issue of what actions would be legally sufficient to terminate the labor exemption.  In 
response, the court observed that “generally the collective bargaining relationship between 
an employer and a particular union exists for as long as that union continues to be the 
recognized bargaining representative of a majority of the employees.”38  The court wrote 
that labor law protects the voluntary nature of union representation and stated, “the NLRA 
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guarantees the employees the right to bargain collectively with representatives of their 
own choosing.”39   
The defendants countered that the final factor in Chevron, concerning the balance of 
equities, favored the plaintiffs because they relied solely on the decision in Powell and 
failed to seek a prompt determination of the labor exemption issue.  The defendants argued 
the plaintiffs had an unfair advantage in the McNeil case because of “the 8th Circuit’s holding 
that the right of first refusal/compensation system portion of Plan B was immune from 
antitrust scrutiny until this Court specified the point in time when the exemption 
expired.”40  The court rejected this claim on the basis that the defendants were clearly put 
on notice that they were not entitled to a permanent immunity from antitrust scrutiny.  The 
court continued, “the players took a drastic step ending their union representation to allow 
individual claims to go forward and have already paid a significant price for the loss of that 
representation.”41 
After the legal wrangling concluded, the courts denied the defendants’ motion for 
partial summary judgment of the plaintiffs’ claims, with three significant issues that 
required attention.  First, there is a relevant market for the services of professional football 
players in the United States.  Second, there is a relevant market for professional football in 
the United States.  Third, the NFL defendants possess monopoly power in each of those 
relevant markets.  The final point reaffirms the court findings in USFL v. NFL that the 
owners had willfully monopolized the market.42  The owners defended that AFL v. NFL was 
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inconsistent with USFL and survived appeal on the basis that NFL defendants did not 
possess monopoly power in the relevant market.43  The McNeil court ruled the AFL case 
was distinguishable from the current arrangements of the labor market and 30 years 
outdated.  On appeal, the defendants contended that the acquisition of the AFL was a 
strategic business action that naturally led to the monopolized market.  The plaintiffs 
countered, using 2nd Circuit notes in USFL, “in 1966, the NFL and AFL agreed to merge, 
largely because the competition for players had sharply increased salaries.  Congress 
exempted this merger from antitrust laws by legislation and not judicial ruling…”44  The 2nd 
Circuit Court ruled in McNeil that the issue of monopoly power is relevant to the inquiry of 
whether the challenged restraints are anticompetitive under the rule of reason.  The 2nd 
Circuit continued: 
 Defendants argue that monopolization of an output product market, that 
 is the market of professional football, is irrelevant to a determination of the  
 legality of restraints in an input labor market, that is the market for professional 
 football player services.  They nevertheless premise their entire rule of reason 
 defense on the alleged necessity of implementing player restraints in the  
 relevant input market in order to strengthen their ability to compete in the  
 output market. 
  
The USFL jury verdict thus became a tested precedent for the McNeil case.  Unlike the 
situation in 1992, the court noted that a rival league existed at the time of the USFL case.  
The jury had found that the NFL had monopoly powers in USFL, a situation less compelling 
than the current market arrangements.  The jury in McNeil ruled that Plan B restraints 
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act and inflicted economic injury on the plaintiffs.  The 
McNeil verdict precluded the owners from re-litigating the existence of their monopoly 
power in the relevant market of professional football.   
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 The McNeil case is monumental because it eliminated the NFL’s nonstatutory 
protection from antitrust scrutiny and owners’ monopsony control over free agency.  It 
validated the Radovich and 1970s court rulings against the reserve system and opened the 
door for future lawsuits by NFL players.  McNeil paved the way for players to obtain an 
improved free agent system. 
 After the McNeil case, several lawsuits were filed by players seeking antitrust 
injunctions and damages stemming from various reserve system practices like Plan B free 
agency, the standard players’ contract, and the draft.    In Jackson v. NFL players said the 
same injuries ruled in McNeil affected and restrained them from becoming free agents.45  
The court granted a temporary restraining order against the NFL and Plan B free agency, 
stating “the players would suffer irreparable injury each week they remained restricted 
under the NFL-imposed system of player restraints.”46   
Shortly after Jackson, Reggie White and four other players demanded total or 
modified free agency for all current or future players, not merely individual players named 
in the lawsuit.47  It stated that the lawsuit was brought on behalf of: 
(i) all players who have been, are now, or will be under contract to play 
professional football for an NFL club at any time from August 31, 1987, 
to the date of final judgment and … 
(ii) all college and other football players who, as of August 31, 1987, to the 
date of final judgment have been, are now, or will be eligible to play 
football as a rookie for an NFL team. 
 
This action of solidarity marked the first time the players explicitly expressed interest to be 
recognized as a collective in any particular lawsuit.  In response, the court certified a 
settlement class for damages and injunctions.  
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 The owners did not like the pattern of the court decisions and feared the White case 
would follow form and would decrease the owners’ ability to restrain players within the 
league.  Rather than chance another defeat in court, the owners offered to settle with the 
players and conceded a new free agent system.  The plaintiffs in White agreed to settle the 
case and all other ongoing litigation related to the labor dispute.  The Minnesota District 
Court mediated the settlement process and granted a preliminary approval of the 
agreement.  Any interested party in the settlement was allowed to present grievances 
before the court for several weeks.  The court overruled the few objections and enjoined 
every individual lawsuit by NFL players with similar claims into a class group.  The 
agreement, known as the “White Settlement Agreement,” had several significant 
elements.48  First, it granted all NFL players unrestricted free agency after completing the 
terms of their initial contract, which for most players came after their fourth season in the 
league.  As a condition to the agreement, only players who were actively litigating a similar 
claim at the time of White were allowed free agency in 1993.  All other players had to wait 
until the 1994 season to become free agents.  Second, as a compromise to free agency, the 
players agreed to a salary cap that was derived from a percentage of the League’s defined 
gross revenue (DGR).49  The exact percentage of the initial salary cap was considered an 
issue for collective bargaining.  Therefore, the 1993 season was played without a salary cap 
in order to bargain a proper level for the 1994 season.  As a part of the settlement 
negotiations, owners approved a salary floor to coincide with the salary cap.  Each team 
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was required to pay a minimum amount each year for player salaries.   The salary floor was 
established as 85 percent of a particular season’s salary cap amount.   
The players agreed to recertify the NFLPA as a third condition of the White 
agreement.  This caused tension with many players, including NFLPA Executive Director 
Gene Upshaw who stated, “we didn’t plan to recertify the union, it was the owners who 
requested it.”50  The last major part of the settlement dictated that any amendment to the 
agreement must be approved by the Minnesota District Court’s Judge William Doty.  The 
NFL and NFLPA agreed to give Judge Doty control over dispute resolution and final consent 
judgment over the league’s labor agreements. 
After receiving free agency in the settlement, veteran players grew less concerned 
with labor issues that affected future players.  As a consequence, the draft and standard 
players’ contract remained active elements of the NFL labor arrangement to be bargained 
over in upcoming negotiations.  One week after the White settlement the recertified NFLPA 
and NFL offered a new CBA to the district court for approval.  The CBA mirrored the 
settlement agreement and was successfully approved by the district court on April 30th, 
1993.  
 
Collective Bargaining Period (1993 – 2008) 
 The 1993 CBA brought a new era to the NFL and redefined the status quo 
arrangements of the labor market.  The players had successfully won free agency through 
litigation and began to test the open market.  Owners sought to salvage the reserve system 
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and looked for new strategies to control player mobility, maintain the league’s competitive 
balance, and maximize profits.  
 
Player Mobility 
 The 1993 CBA did not change the NFL’s draft process as a means to control the 
entrance of new talent into the league.  The draft expires at the end of each extension and 
remains a relevant topic for collective bargaining.   In order for the draft to remain active, it 
must be accepted by the NFLPA during each bargaining period.  From 1993-2008, the 
traditional arrangements of the draft did not change.   
 Veteran players did not receive improved conditions during the life of the 1993 CBA 
either.  The agreement allowed veteran players to become free agents after four seasons in 
the league and did not change during the bargaining period.  The only exception came in 
2008 when the owners opted out of the 2006 extension.   According to the 2006 CBA, if the 
owners chose to opt out of the agreement, then, starting in 2010, a player would become an 
unrestricted free agent after six seasons.51  The 2010 season was played under this new 
arrangement, and it remains the status quo until a new CBA can be negotiated.  
 
Revenue Share  
 The owners’ revenue share offered to players as stipulated in the 1993 CBA is 
derived from a percentage of the League’s DGR.  The percentage represents an estimation 
of the League’s projected revenue for the upcoming season.  The salary cap is established 
by quantifying a dollar amount from the percentage of DGR, subtracting player benefit 
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costs, and dividing by the number of teams in the league.  In 1994, the percentage of DGR 
allocated to player costs was 59.3 percent.52  This translated into a players’ revenue share 
of $1.079 billion and created the first NFL salary cap at $33,718,750.  As a result of the 
salary cap, the mean players’ salary decreased from $660,000 in 1993 to $628,000.   
The 1993 season had no salary cap and marked the first season of free agency for 
certain players.  The revenue share received by players in 1993 was a drastic increase from 
previous seasons.  From 1990 to 1992 the average revenue share received by players was 
55.3 percent (Vrooman, 2011).  In 1993, the players’ share was 68.5 percent.  This share 
was responsible for a 38 percent increase in player salaries.  In 1994, the salary cap was 
established and the revenue share decreased to 59.3 percent.53  It decreased again in 1995 
to 56.9 percent heading into the 1996 bargaining period.   
 The first three seasons of the 1996 CBA show a recognizable pattern to the 
owner/player revenue sharing system.  At the beginning of each extension, the revenue 
share is at its peak before depreciating over the length of the agreement.  This pattern is 
caused by the strategic positioning of the league’s television contracts. The owners 
brokered the television contracts to expire the same year as each extension.  A significant 
portion of the salary cap was associated with the television contracts’ ratio to the DGR, so 
changes in the television contracts had a causal effect on the revenue share.  Following the 
previous example, the 1996 extension to the CBA saw the revenue share increase to 61.4 
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percent.  In the three subsequent years of the 1996 extension, the players’ revenue share 
decreased to 58.9, 56.4, and 55.9 percent, respectively.54   
The television contract negotiations became a point of contention during the 2002 
CBA negotiations because the NFLPA was not included in the bargaining sessions between 
the NFL and television networks (Halchin 2008).  The NFLPA filed an unfair labor practice 
with the NLRB, but the motion was denied a hearing.  The NLRB cited a lack of sufficient 
claim to justify the need to be present at the contract negotiations.  The NFLPA remained 
excluded until the 2006 CBA extension.  The owners offered the NFLPA a larger revenue 
share as a compromise to this conflict.  The years 2002-2005 mark the only time period the 
players’ revenue share increased over the course of the agreement rising from 61.5 percent 
in 2002 to 63.5 percent in 2005.55  The 2005 revenue share was the highest percentage 
received by players since the 1993 season. 
 The 2006 CBA made the most significant changes to the NFL’s revenue share 
arrangements.  Before the bargaining period started, the owners were in conflict with each 
other over the League revenue share between teams, not players.  The stadium initiative of 
the 1990s created a situation where teams with newer stadiums were enjoying large profit 
margins due to unshared revenue.  Newer stadiums offered more luxury boxes, expensive 
club seating, and personal seat licenses (PSL) that generated exclusive revenue for a 
team.56  Owners who operated in outdated stadiums received diminishing returns 
compared to owners in newer stadiums.   
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 The NFL offered a solution for the owners to be negotiated in the 2006 CBA.  In 
order to balance the league revenue share between teams, the owners agreed to broaden 
the scope of the DGR to include total revenue (TR).57   In the past, the DGR was established 
primarily from the national television contracts, licensing agreements, and visitor gate 
receipts.  The new TR system contained all team income including luxury boxes, club 
seating, PSLs, and game day parking fees.  As a compromise to the new arrangement, the 
NFLPA agreed to reduce the players’ share of the TR to 57.0 percent, instead of 64.5 
percent under the DGR system.  The players received a smaller percentage of a larger pie 
and the salary cap rose from $94.5 million (DGR) to $102 million (TR) per club.  A 
stipulation to the new system was an owners’ deduction of various operation expenses 
before the players’ revenue share calculation.  The credit deductions helped owners offset 
the cost of new stadium financing, luxury box and club seating depreciation, and increased 
operational expenses of the larger stadiums.  The owners bargained the more expensive 
stadiums increased the revenue share for all parties.  The NFLPA accepted the terms on the 
condition the owners would include them in all future contract and licensing negotiations 
with external sponsors and agencies.    
 The three seasons affected by the 2006 CBA before the owners opted out of the 
agreement in 2008 saw a substantial growth in player salaries but not in the percentage of 
revenue share.  The revenue share for the seasons 2006-2008 was calculated at 57.0, 57.0, 
and 57.5 percent, respectively.58  The mean average players’ salary rose 20 percent in 
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2006, 8 percent in 2007, and 13 percent in 2008 to reach $1.94 million dollars (see Table 
1). 
Table 1: NFL Total Revenue and Percentage of Players’ Share 
 Total Revenue¹ National 
Revenue %² 
Player %³ Mean Salary⁴ % Change⁵ 
1986 859 NA 49 198 3.8 
1993 1,745 75.2 68.5 666 37.7 
1994 1,819 70.3 59.3 628 -5.7 
1995 2,142 67.2 56.9 717 14.1 
1996 2,235 65.9 61.4 788 9.9 
1997 2,382 64.3 58.9 737 -6.5 
1998 3,138 69.4 56.4 993 34.7 
1999 3,423 67.2 55.9 1056 6.4 
2000 3,938 63.5 61.7 1116 5.7 
2001 4,284 63.4 57.1 1101 -1.4 
2002 4,944 59.9 61.5 1316 19.6 
2003 5,330 60.0 62.6 1209 -4.3 
2004 6,029 58.8 63.1 1331 5.7 
2005 6,160 59.9 63.5 1396 4.9 
2006 6,539 61.1 57 1687 20.8 
2007 7,090 61.2 57 1712 1.5 
2008 7,575 62.1 57.5 1947 13.7 
1 Total revenue (TR) in millions of U.S. dollars (Forbes). 
2 Percentage of TR that is attributed to national television contracts (Forbes; Murphy and Topel 2009). 
3 Players share of the NFL revenue. 
4 Mean salary of NFL players in thousands of U.S. dollars (Forbes) 
5 Percentage change of NFL players’ mean salary year over year 
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Benefits 
 Benefits are funded from a portion of the League’s total revenue that is allocated to 
players.   In 1987, benefits represented 10 percent of the players’ revenue share, 
supporting both active and retired players (Halchin 2008).  Under the 1993 CBA, benefits 
are defined as “the aggregate for a League Year of all sums paid…by the NFL and all NFL 
teams for, to, or on behalf of present or former NFL players, but only for (i) pension 
funding, (ii) group insurance, (iii) injury protection, (iv) workers’ compensation, (v) pre-
season per diem, (vi) travel expenses, (vii) postseason pay, (viii) player medical costs, (ix) 
tuition assistance, and (x) players’ health reimbursement account.”59   
 The NFLPA has a persistent conflict between active and retired players concerning 
benefits that is similar to the owners’ issues with team revenue share.  All monies 
designated for the retired players’ benefit programs are apportioned from each season’s 
revenue share allocated to current players.  Current players sacrifice a percentage of each 
season’s monies to facilitate the needs of all retired players.  The NFLPA only represents 
current NFL players during negotiations, so the monies provided to retired players is at the 
discretion of the represented players.  For this reason, the NFLPA constantly seeks more 
benefit concessions from the owners in order to offset the tax on current players by retired 
players. 
 The 1993 CBA established many new benefit programs for active and retired 
players.   Players became vested after five credited seasons and earned a benefit credit for 
each year played.60  The benefit credit was established at a rate of $80 a month for each 
credited season.  A retired vested player was eligible to receive pension benefits at age 55, 
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or 20 years after retiring from the league, whichever came later.  The 1993 CBA allowed 
players who were one credited season shy of vestment, eligibility to receive a lump sum 
payment at the current rate of pension compensation for years played in the league.  The 
Retiree Medical Plan afforded retired players access to the active players’ group insurance 
benefits.61 Previously, retired players who were vested in the league received full benefits 
for 48 months and a 50 percent reduction thereafter.   A Second Career Savings Plan was 
created for teams to match individual player contributions to the fund with a maximum 
value of $25,000.62  All players, including those in their first-year, may contribute to the 
plan.  However, a player must have at least two credited seasons, with at least one season 
in 2006 or later, to receive a matching contribution from a team.  So, a player who retired in 
2005 or before did not receive matching funds.  Those who participated in the plan and 
played in 2006 received retroactive payments to compensate for a team’s matching 
contribution between 1993 and 2006. 
A severance pay system was established in the 1982 CBA giving players $5,000 for 
every credited season in the league, regardless of vested circumstances.  The 1993 CBA 
required a minimum of two credited seasons, with at least one season occurring prior to 
1993.  A player received $10,000 for every credited season as a lump sum payment once he 
formally requested severance pay and gave notice of permanently ending employment with 
league teams.  
Total and Permanent Disability Benefit Program (T & P) was created in 1970 to help 
active players and vested retired players who were permanently disabled as determined by 
the Retirement Board.   A player must have an accredited season after 1958 to be eligible.  
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T & P benefits were payable for a player’s entire life.  Before the 1993 CBA, the NFLPA or 
players did not have a representative on the Retirement Board, which acted as a ruling 
party for all relevant retirement issues and eligibility requirements.  After 1993, the NFLPA 
and active players were allowed one representative each on the Retirement Board to 
oversee and rule on the cases.63   
A Tuition Reimbursement Program was the final amendment offered to players’ 
benefits program with the 1993 CBA.64  It reimbursed players who entered the draft before 
they completed their college degrees or who wished to obtain a graduate or professional 
degree reimbursement for all expenses incurred while attending the school of their choice.  
Related expenses were defined as tuition, fees, books, and a small stipend at a maximum 
yearly amount of $10,000.  Players were eligible for the program if they were on an active 
NFL roster while continuing their education and had at least two credited seasons in the 
league.   
 The 1998 extension established an annuity program for retired players with an 
initial payment by the league of $25 million dollars.65  The annuity program was a deferred 
compensation program that allocated $65,000 for every credited season a vested player 
was in the league.  The annuity program did not apply to vested players before the 1998 
season.  The extension also increased the lowest benefit credit offered to a monthly 
payment of $80 to $100.  The pension eligibility requirement was lowered from five to four 
credited seasons in order for players to become vested.66  The lowered qualification did not 
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apply to retired players.  Finally, the active players’ revenue share allocated to retired 
player benefits rose to 15%.67 
 The 2002 CBA negotiations allowed players with injured reserve seasons prior to 
1970 to be counted towards pension eligibility.  This change caused a 4% increase in the 
number of seasons claimed by players in the pension program and allowed over 300 
retired players to become vested (Halchin 2008).  A majority of those players had not 
received vested interest because the injured reserve seasons had left them short of the 
necessitated quota.  The lowest benefit credits rose again from $100 to $200.  The 
extension created a health reimbursement account (HRA).68  The HRA was an annual 
contribution by the League of $25,000 or $50,000 depending on a player’s eligibility, to 
reimburse a player for healthcare expenses during time periods when he is not covered in a 
CBA.   The reimbursement to an individual player is capped at $300,000.  At least eight 
credited seasons was required for players whose last credited season was 2005 or before 
to receive $25,000.  Players in 2006 or later needed at least 3 credited seasons to receive 
$50,000.  The Tuition Reimbursement Program’s maximum yearly amount was raised to 
$15,000.  As a final measure, the 2002 extension raised the severance payout to $15,000 for 
each credited season in the league.69  The $15,000 was applied only to seasons after 2002, 
so a player whose career spanned from 1999 to 2005 would receive $10,000 for the three 
seasons before 2002 and $15,000 for the 4 seasons after it.         
 The 2006 extension raised the lowest benefit credits for a third time to $250, but 
only for players vested in the league between 1920 and 1982.  The current players, and any 
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vested players after 1983, received a 10% increase in their monthly pensions.70  The 
extension also tripled widows’ and surviving minor children’s benefits for all retired and 
current players.  By far, the most significant amendment came in the form of the Plan 88 
program created by the league.  Plan 88 provides retired players with up to $88,000 per 
year for medical care resulting from dementia or other head trauma.71  Funding for 
dementia research is also provided by the league at no expense to players.  Plan 88 
established a network of medical specialists who focused on neurological care, spine 
treatment, joint replacements, and discount prescription drugs.   The plan doubled the T & 
P disability benefit to $40,000 and reduced the periodic reviews to once every five years.72  
Finally, the extension substantially increased a vested players’ line of duty benefits 
eligibility.73  Eligibility to apply for benefits became correlated with the number of credited 
seasons a player was in the League.  Instead of only 48 months to apply for benefits, a 
player who accrued eight seasons in the NFL would have eight years to apply for line of 
duty benefits.  
 It is estimated that the NFL paid approximately $919.6 million dollars for retired 
player benefits in 2007 (Forbes).  The NFLPA claimed that active players provided $181.6 
million of this amount under the revenue share system.74  The NFLPA noted that only 38 
percent of vested retired players were receiving monthly benefits in 2007.    The escalating 
players’ benefit costs were one reason owners opted out in 2008, especially with NFLPA 
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demands for more league contributions without it affecting the current players’ revenue 
share. 
 
Job Security 
 For most NFL players, job security is associated with guaranteed contracts.  Unlike 
other sports leagues, the NFL does not offer many guaranteed compensation contracts for 
players because of the brutal nature of the sport and the unpredictability of players’ 
injuries.  During the course of the collective bargaining period between 1993 and 2008, an 
NFL team’s roster showed that 10 percent of all players at any given time were listed on the 
injured reserve list (Leeds and Allmen, 2005).  This means that 10 percent of all players on 
a team’s active roster at the beginning of a season sustained injuries that left them unable 
to finish the season.  The 1993 CBA did not change this arrangement and only 6 percent of 
all NFL players received guaranteed salary contracts (Vrooman, 2011).  The ratio remained 
relatively constant during the course of the collective bargaining period, with guaranteed 
contracts going to players with league minimum salaries or practice squad players.   
 Guaranteed salary in the NFL is awarded to players through a bonus payment 
system that is associated with contract signings, performance, or participation in team 
activities like off-season workouts.  It became common practice after the 1993 CBA for 
players to receive guaranteed bonuses for participating in team activities.  The amounts of 
compensation were variable to the number of seasons in the league and a player’s position.  
Performance bonuses were integrated as a common practice with the 1998 CBA extension 
but remained variable to each individual player’s contract.75   
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  The NFLPA has stated that signing bonuses are preferred over salary guarantees 
because the money is given in an upfront lump sum payout before a player offers his 
services to a team.  Bonuses are a form of players protection in case they receive a career-
ending injury. Over 60 percent of players during the bargaining period received signing 
bonuses of $250,000 or less (Halchin 2008).  Marquee players received higher signing 
bonuses.  The percentage of players who received a signing bonus in 1987 was 23 percent.  
In 1993, 40 percent of players received signing bonuses in conjunction with their contracts.  
The NFLPA and player agents successfully negotiated more frequent and larger signing 
bonuses as a condition for their players in each extension up to 2002 (Halchin 2008).  As a 
result, in 2001, 82 percent of players received a signing bonus with their contracts.  A 
majority of minimum salaried players and practice squad players did not receive signing 
bonuses.   
 In 2002, the owners negotiated terms that discouraged the policy of signing bonuses 
due to the rising number of players who were suspended from the League and unable to 
contribute to the team.  Though no implicit standard had ever been officially negotiated 
into a CBA concerning signing bonuses, the practice had become an unwritten rule 
encouraged by the NFLPA after 1993.  Owners began to limit the number of signing 
bonuses offered in player contracts resulting in a steady decline over the following years, 
which culminated in only 55 percent of players receiving a signing bonus by 2008.   
 
Impartial Dispute Resolution 
 The 1993 White Settlement Agreement and CBA granted the players a third party 
mediator concerning labor dispute issues.  Judge Doty mediated and reserved final 
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approval over all amendments to the agreements.  However, his jurisdiction in the NFL 
labor market ended with overseeing amendments to the CBA and did not cover the league’s 
disciplining of player conduct or appeals.  The Commissioner’s Office maintained 
jurisdiction in these matters and did not change during the collective bargaining period.   
 There are three exceptions.  First, the 1993 CBA gave the NFLPA and one player full 
representation on the Retirement Board.76  The other exceptions arose in the 2006 
bargaining sessions.  As already discussed, the NFLPA was allowed to participate in the 
league’s television contract negotiations as a condition of the 2006 CBA.77  The third 
exception applied to NFLPA representation of the “on the field” rules change process.  Each 
year, NFL owners hold a weeklong “State of the League” conference to discuss economics 
and vote on relevant league issues, like rule changes, for an upcoming season.78  Before 
2006, the NFLPA had been excluded from these meetings.  The NFLPA was only allowed 
access to the meetings on days when rule changes were being discussed.   
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
Negotiation Context 
The set of relevant U.S. labor laws appears to have the most influence on the 
negotiations between the NFL owners and players.  All of the NFL’s teams reside and 
operate under the jurisdiction of the United States and are accountable to how the laws 
define negotiations, the bargaining interactions, and legal courses of action.  The Sherman 
Act provided the legal precedent that the players use in antitrust lawsuits against the NFL 
and its reserve system.  Every lawsuit against the NFL contains some elements that attack 
the legality of the draft, standard contract, or restrictions on trade, such as free agent 
mobility or the salary cap.  The nonstatutory labor exemption and its protections outside 
the law impeded the players’ ability to negotiate with the owners or seek a third party’s 
intervention.  A cultural prerogative in the United States is that owners/managers and 
workers in American industries understand their situations better than outside arbitrators 
and should pursue collective bargaining to settle disputes regardless of power imbalances 
between the opponents.  Historically, the players were at an extreme disadvantage 
compared to the owners because of the reserve system and the owners’ ability to avoid 
fully negotiating the players’ demands.   
 The NFL isn’t as susceptible to the business cycle the way other industries are 
affected.  Due to its strategic revenue share program and popularity with fans, the NFL has 
continued to increase its relative market share and revenue streams.  The current recession 
has slowed growth, but owners’ net operational income continues to be healthy and secure.  
The largest effects the economy has on the NFL are the monies that media outlets, 
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corporate sponsors, and fans can spend on NFL interests.  The media outlets and corporate 
sponsors have remained constant and continue to grow for the NFL, despite the decline in 
other industries.  In many ways, the NFL controls the media outlets because of the 
excessive amounts of money exchanged in the contracts.  The media outlets—which 
depend on NFL “content”—must market the league sufficiently to reap a return on their 
own investments. The state of the overall U.S. economy, though influential in the decision-
making of league officials, does not seem to impinge on the NFL labor market despite 
owners’ claims to the contrary.  
 Though the NFL and NFLPA are experienced and familiar with the industry’s 
negotiation process, they do not approach it with equal experience.  Players enter and leave 
the league each season due to the draft, retirement, and injuries.  As mentioned, players 
have short career lifespans.  As consequence, the NFLPA represents a different group of 
players during each bargaining session.  The owners’ membership is more static; almost all 
owners acting in the 2011 bargaining sessions will have participated in early NFL 
negotiations.79  The team owners are middle-aged businessmen, competent in the language, 
tactics, and implications associated of each bargaining action.  The players, by comparison, 
lack experience.  They are mostly young, fresh out of college, not from the same social class 
as owners, and often focus more on developing their playing abilities than their business 
acumen.  Players’ decisions can be influenced by the union, veteran and retired players, 
their agents, and the media.  The NFL and NFLPA share similar bargaining experience, but 
the owners are seasoned veterans compared to the relative rookie status of players.  
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Consequently, the owners have dominated the labor relationship because they benefit from 
the reserve system and the strategic disadvantages of the players’ limited resources, 
experience, and time. 
 Under the collective bargaining arrangement, the NFLPA struggled to undermine the 
anti-competitive nature of the reserve system and the NFL’s monopoly power over 
professional football in the U.S.  The players had few alternatives other than decertifying in 
1989.  Decertification made the NFL adhere to the larger social order of the United States’s 
legal system, whose jurisdiction outranked the NFL and exposed the reserve system to a 
level of authority beyond the owners’ control.  The lawsuits of the 1970s and the 
decertified action of 1989 represent two significant periods in the NFL’s negotiated order 
when the players were able to achieve some of their goals.  Until 1993, the players could 
not bypass the nonstatutory labor exemption’s legal protection of the owners from 
antitrust scrutiny.  Once the barrier was removed, the owners became eager to reach an 
agreement and insisted upon a return to the collective bargaining arrangements.  However, 
the 1989 decertification and the White ruling changed the status quo from a monopsony 
empowered elite group of owners to a more egalitarian relationship based on organic 
solidarity and reciprocity.  The data demonstrate that each side benefited from the new 
free agent/salary cap arrangement, maximizing profits for all.  
 The main interests of the owners and players have not changed since the bargaining 
relationship began in 1970.  Each negotiation period is routinized by the same issues, 
actions, and representatives (NFL and NFLPA), with minimal variation over time.  The 
negotiations are connected by the nature of the collective bargaining process.  Each time a 
CBA expires, the bargaining parties have the chance to renegotiate the conditional 
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arrangements.  The time between NFL bargaining sessions was variable, but recurs 
approximately every 5 years (1968, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1993, etc.).  Typically, the 
concessions received by players in a previous CBA remain valid in a new CBA, but 
unresolved conflicts become objects of interest for future negotiations and can escalate into 
tensions, mistrust, bitterness, and a lack of cooperation between the groups.    Each CBA 
symbolically represents a temporal peace for the duration of the agreement.   
The NFL owners need CBAs for more reasons than sheer market power.  
Professional football before the NFL consisted of loosely banded teams that had no inter-
team affiliations.  It was impossible to create a sustainable product because team owners 
did not know which teams would be available to schedule games with the following year. 
The same type of problems would surface in the present-day NFL without binding 
collective agreements.  For example, if the Dallas Cowboys acted purely in its own self-
interest, it would play a 20-game national schedule to maximize its profit potential, while 
the Cincinnati Bengals would perhaps play only 12 regional games because it is more cost 
efficient in its market.  The league would have no national media contracts or licensing 
agreements because each team would negotiate its own contracts for presumably less 
money than a collective could obtain.  Large market teams would dominate the industry, 
possibly resulting in a diminished league with only a few national-interest teams.  The 
CBAs bring together the players and owners into a single group with shared interests and 
goals. 
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Findings Analysis 
The findings suggest that there is only partial support for the success of 
decertification to improve the four key variables I measured.  The overall pattern I found is 
that the strategy of decertification/litigation was effective in securing a major change in 
players’ status – ‘free agency’ – and improving player mobility.  The other three variables 
were more weakly affected.      
Free agency remained the most consistent need for players from the beginning of 
the NFL’s labor market negotiations.  The findings show that decertified litigation enhanced 
the players’ mobility far more than collective bargaining could have produced between 
1987-1993; or improvements achieved between 1994-2008 were minor by comparison.  
Without the decertified action, it is realistic to infer that players would not have achieved 
unrestricted free agency because it was a concession the owners continue to deny in 
collective bargaining.     
The court mediated rulings altered the players’ core status in the bargaining 
relationship.  All three lawsuits attacked the legality of the restrictions placed by owners on 
players’ mobility.  The victory in McNeil was a culmination of over 50 years of organized 
negotiations with owners over unrestricted free agency.  In the NFL, all binding issues and 
rules must be incorporated into a CBA before they become operational.  The court can 
declare one of the owners’ anti-competitive behaviors to be in violation of the Sherman Act, 
but it remains abstract and external to the league’s operations until it’s bargained into an 
agreement.  White would have failed to grant free agency to players without the settlement 
agreement and associated 1993 CBA.  This illustrates how a cycle of decertified litigation 
followed by collective bargaining functions far better than each strategy alone. 
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Consequently, the players’ use of litigation, though successful in 1993 for obtaining 
free agency, may not be an effective strategy for other negotiation situations.  If an 
organization such as the NFL refuses to adopt litigated policies into its structures, then the 
court rulings have little effect on the actual operations and work conditions of those 
entities.  A successful third party intervention occurs only when recommendations are 
incorporated into the structures and practices of the organization and become part of the 
structural context.    Despite winning the court cases in the 1970s, it took the players more 
than 25 years before those conditions were accepted into the NFL’s negotiated order.  This 
is one of the biggest problems associated with alternative modes of action such as 
decertification because the social order does not change until the structures surrounding 
the traditional arrangements also change.      
  The two most commonly cited litigation interests for players besides free agency are 
the reserve system’s influence on the draft and the standard players’ contract.  These two 
restrictive measures will not disappear in the manner that brought free agency.  Neither 
the owners nor players will relinquish the draft as a condition shaping the labor market.  
The owners have staged the draft as a celebratory and ritualized spectacle that future 
players anticipate eagerly as their debut into the league.  Before the 2011 Draft, the NFLPA 
asked collegiate players to boycott the Draft because of the current lockout, but the players 
refused.  Every player alluded to the desire to walk across the stage, shake the 
commissioner’s hand, put on his new jersey, and listen to the fans cheer for his draft 
selection.  The draft has become meaningful to the players and their families as the day 
their childhood dreams come true.    
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 The standard players’ contract, despite its questionable nature, is a necessary evil 
for the NFL to ensure that all players adhere to the same binding agreements and 
membership rights in the league.  Amendments may be made to the standard players’ 
contract, but it seems unrealistic that dramatic changes will occur.   The NFL and NFLPA 
will eventually agree to a new CBA and these terms will be codified in that agreement 
because both parties support and/or accept those practices.   
 A primary function of the standard players’ contract is the players’ 
acknowledgement of the commissioner’s role as judge and jury over league matters.  
Decertification did not improve the status quo arrangement for players, nor did collective 
bargaining.  Judge Doty and the Minnesota District Court did assume jurisdiction over the 
amendments to the 1993 White Settlement Agreement and CBA, but this oversight was not 
permanent nor encompassing.  No formal impartial system was established under the 
litigation strategy.  Collective bargaining granted NFLPA representation on the rules 
committee, but this was a minor change.  The commissioner maintained the right to veto 
contracts and to manage behaviors, discipline players, and resolve disputes.  The players 
still lack an impartial mechanism to appeal the commissioner’s rulings or seek a third 
party’s intervention on any matter stipulated in a CBA and/or players’ contract. 
 Similarly, the research demonstrates that neither decertification nor collective 
bargaining improved players’ job security.  Due to the relevant nature of the game of 
football, NFL players have an average career life-span of 3.8 seasons.  Their “playing days” 
can be cut short due to injury or declining skill, so maximizing compensation during 
players’ tenures in the NFL is a major concern.  Decertification allowed veteran players to 
seek better compensation with more mobility, but this is not security because many 
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players will never realize the four-year minimum requirement to become a free agent.  
Collective bargaining helped players’ job security by initially increasing the guaranteed 
signing bonuses paid to players as a condition of their contracts from 40 percent of all 
peoples in 1993 to 82 percent in 2002.  However, in the second half of the bargaining 
period, this trend reversed and by 2008, the percent of players receiving guaranteed 
bonuses was only 55 percent.  It’s fair to say that the drop in the percentage of players 
receiving bonuses was a retrenchment by owners to offset risk.  Either way, players’ job 
security remained conditional and players did not receive guaranteed contracts or 
compensation other than the bonus payment structure, which was highly variable during 
the time-frame of the study.     
   The main bargaining interest in the 2011 negotiations concerns the players’ 
percentage of revenue share.  It can be argued that players received a higher percentage of 
league revenue through decertification than collective bargaining, but the findings are far 
from definitive.  Revenue share, like most labor market issues, is handled through collective 
bargaining rather than the courts.  Courts can assess and award damages and impose 
injunctions against bargaining actions but cannot dictate the exact distribution of revenue 
to either party.   
Revenue sharing varied considerably in the research and had many mediating 
factors such as the leagues’ projected income, television contracts, licensing agreements, 
and fan attendance.  Comparing the standards in 1986 with 1993, we notice a dramatic 
change in the players’ share of league revenue during decertification.  The revenue share 
rose from 49 to 68.5 percent, but these numbers may prove misleading because 1993 was 
an uncapped year.  An interesting finding is that before 1989 the NFLPA continuously failed 
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to secure a 55 percent revenue share for players.  After the 1993 CBA, the players’ revenue 
share did not decrease below 55 percent.  The closest it came to falling below this 
threshold was in 1999 with 55.9 percent.  The rise in salaries remained fixed under the 
salary cap and tied to the increased revenue generated by the NFL.   
 Collective bargaining provided the players with increases in revenue share in 2002 
and 2006.  The 2002 agreement was the only time that players’ revenue share remained 
above 60 percent for the course of the agreement.  The restructuring of the 2006 CBA 
reduced the players’ percentage but increased the monies allocated to player salaries 
under the salary cap.  These changes were not as substantial as those made between 1986 
and 1993, nor as consistent over as long a duration.  The 2002 agreement lasted four 
seasons and the 2006 agreement lasted only three, until the owners opted out of the CBA to 
renegotiate the labor arrangements.   
 
Conclusion 
 Decertification alone did not produce major changes to the status quo other than 
player mobility because modern labor markets require formal structures and policies.  The 
NFL operates like a cartel and needs to bind all of its members into a single association of 
functioning parts.  This is one reason the owners insisted that the NFLPA be recertified as a 
condition of the White settlement, as a way to reorganize the players’ new status as 
potential free agents into a new CBA.  Without CBAs as an organizational mechanism, the 
NFL would struggle to maintain its groupthink mentality and operational capacity.   
My analysis shows that decertification and collective bargaining are not opposing 
strategies; one sets the stage for the other.  The eventual outcome of litigation within the 
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NFL labor market will be a return to a two-party bargaining relation.  Decertification 
functions as a sequential rather than alternative strategy that players may deploy in 
negotiations.  As a sequential strategy, decertified litigation helps a significant status 
change for the players in the labor market but cannot finesse within-status reforms.  The 
latter is reserved for collective bargaining within the context of the negotiated order and 
the larger, prevailing social order.  Decertification helped to create free agency, but CBAs 
are the most likely mechanisms for changes until another fundamental status change is or 
may be sought. 
 Decertification realized free agency for NFL players in less than five years based on 
the antitrust statues of the United States, but it was an evolved process.   The 1970s NFL 
players did not capitalize on free agency with Mackey because of their inexperience in 
converting litigated victories into status quo agreements.  The players in 1993 learned 
from their predecessors and immediately followed the McNeil verdict with a class action 
lawsuit to bind the ruling into a formal agreement, which it accomplished in White.  The 
status-altering shift earned by players in the settlement greatly increased players’ mobility 
and relative revenue share, but only when conjoined with the owners’ interests and 
acceptance of a salary cap. 
The White victory offered the players more than mobility; it created a partnership 
between owners and players who both now share in the league’s success.  As the research 
suggests, this partnership would not have been possible without the players’ decertified 
action and the court’s intervention.  Such abrupt changes seem less feasible through 
traditional arrangements like collective bargaining because the operative functions of an 
organization constrain the participating members’ actions.  Status-altering shifts seem 
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more probable under a decertification/litigation model because it operates outside the 
status quo and demands the intervention of a third party.  This action does not guarantee 
success, but it permits the reinterpretation of the social order’s formal structures by an 
impartial mediator, which within-status bargaining relations rarely accomplish.  Collective 
bargaining supports negotiations over the NFL’s operative structures that influence 
revenue share, job security, and impartial mediation but does not produce dramatic 
changes of the formal structures.  Only litigation realized this goal for the players as free 
agency forced the owners to compete for available players’ talent, acknowledge the players’ 
discretionary needs, and increase the players’ bargaining positions relative to the owners.  
The players’ status change – the 1993 CBA’s concession of free agency – completely altered 
the status quo arrangements of the labor market and is the most significant improvement 
the players have realized within the NFL’s negotiated order.   
 The NFL’s negotiated order is a continuous process with temporal limits that must 
be reevaluated periodically over time and sometimes dramatically altered.  It will be 
interesting to see how the organizational structures of the NFL change as a reaction to the 
current conflict between the owners and players.  Most likely the broad standards that 
oversee the general operations of the NFL will not change as they did in 1993 with free 
agency.  The players and owners now share the responsibility of maintaining the league’s 
competitive balance and profitability.  The owners will continue to seek new ways to limit 
effective actions of players in negotiations.  The players will seek more concessions.  
Regardless, the present conditions of the NFL’s negotiated order pose too great a risk for 
either party to detour too far off course. 
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